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Abstract 
 
People frequently see design in nature that reflects intuitive teleological thinking– that is, 
the order in nature that supports life suggests it was designed for that purpose. This 
research proposes that inferences are stronger when nature supports human life in 
particular. Five studies (total N = 1788) examine evidence for an anthro-teleological bias. 
People agreed more with design statements framed to aid humans (e.g., “trees produce 
oxygen so that humans can breathe”) than the same statements framed to aid other targets 
(“trees produce oxygen so that leopards can breathe”). The bias was greatest when 
advantages for humans were well-known and salient (e.g., the ozone layer) and decreased 
when advantages for other targets were made explicit.  The bias was not eliminated by 
highlighting the benefits for other species, however, and emerged spontaneously for 
novel phenomena (Jupiter’s gravity protects Earth from asteroids). We conclude that 
anthropocentric biases enhance existing teleological biases to see stronger design in 
phenomena where it enables human survival.   
 
Keywords: Teleological thinking, Anthropocentrism, Intelligent Design, Egocentrism, 
Explanation 
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Anthropocentric biases in teleological thinking:  
How nature seems designed for humans. 
A common argument for the existence of God is the argument from design: that 
there is an order to life and in the Universe that defies random chance, and so appears to 
have been planned and created by an intentional agent. In his famous watchmaker 
analogy, for example, William Paley (1802) compared the complexity of nature and the 
universe to finding a pocket watch on the beach: the intricate mechanisms and precise 
function of the watch suggests it could not form by mere chance but must be designed for 
this purpose in mind.   But notably, many examples and analogies in support of design 
refer to phenomena that are important to human survival in particular —from the 
complexity of the human eye, to the fine-tuning of our universe to support intelligent life 
(Barrow & Tipler, 1986; Wilson, 1991). We think this is no coincidence but is the 
product of intuitive anthropocentric biases that enhance teleological reasoning toward 
human life.  Anthropocentric biases can trigger intuitive design thinking by enhancing the 
relative salience and importance of consequences for our own species.  Here we 
investigate such an anthro-teleological bias in the inference to design, where judgments 
of design in nature are enhanced where it serves human survival, compared to that of 
other species.  
 
Teleology and Design in Nature 
There is something genuinely compelling to the argument from design—how else 
could something both complex and useful (whether a pocket watch, an eye, or a 
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Universe) come about by accident?  Design arguments are compelling because they draw 
on deep-rooted social-cognitive biases that connect agents with goals and actions 
(Kelemen, 2004). In particular, design arguments employ teleological thinking (from the 
Greek telos: end, purpose), where events that serve a critical function (e.g., a Universe 
that supports intelligent life) are perceived as intended for that purpose (Dennett, 1987). 
Adopting a teleological stance helps us to quickly interpret the functions of manmade 
objects, e.g., understanding that a fishing rod was designed for the purpose of catching 
fish, but is also readily applied to natural phenomena when it is not scientifically 
warranted (Kelemen, 1999; 2004). For example, young children might describe rocks as 
“for” sitting, and mountains as “for” climbing (Kelemen, 1999), though these uses are 
unrelated to how (or why) they were made. If an end-state serves a function, even 
incidentally, it is easily perceived as for that purpose (Gergeley & Csibra, 2003). This 
overt teleological reasoning declines as we mature (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009) but 
remains a default cognitive stance in adulthood (Lombrozo, Kelemen, & Zaitchik, 2007), 
even among those with formal scientific training (Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2013).  
Teleological reasoning therefore lends itself to seeing design in nature, including 
biological processes such as evolution (Tennant, 1928), where outcomes often serve 
important and specific functions to support life (Lombrozo & Carey, 2006; Lombrozo & 
Rehder, 2012). For example, polar bears’ thick fur keeps them warm in winter, an 
adaptation the result of thousands of generations of bears who lived or died in cold 
weather. But it is much easier to think the thick fur evolved to keep bears warm, than as 
the whittling-down of random variations that is actually involved in natural selection. 
Indeed, evolution is commonly misunderstood as a directed process toward solving 
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problems of survival (Gould, 1996; Shtulman, 2006).  Teleological thinking is not limited 
to thinking about biology, however, but can be used to interpret any natural phenomena 
that are uniquely configured to support life, such as Earth’s ozone layer that protects 
humans and other species from deadly radiation. While evolutionary adaptations are 
typically self-serving (e.g., fur is an advantage to the bear herself), non-biological 
phenomena with teleological implications are usually other-serving, meaning that the 
implied purpose is to aid another target (Keil, 1992; Kelemen, 2003). Teleological 
judgments might be considered scientifically unwarranted here (Casler & Kelemen, 
2008), yet some prominent examples of teleological thinking toward nature are seen to 
serve other targets (Sagan, 1973).  
 
Anthropocentrism in Teleological Thinking  
One of the most important cues for judgments of design is the appearance of fine-
tuning- that there is a special configuration in nature that is uniquely suited to support life 
(Dembski, 2004). Intelligent Design Theory makes frequent reference to fine-tuning and 
defines it as a “specified complexity” (Dembski, 2004):  if conditions are arranged in a 
way that is especially unlikely, complex, and beneficial, it cannot arise from chance but 
must be by design. For example, Earth is located in the “Goldilocks Zone” (Ward & 
Brownlee, 2000), so-called because its distance from the Sun appears perfectly fine-tuned 
(“just right”) to support life. The quintessential example of fine-tuning is the Anthropic 
Cosmological Principle (Carter, 1974; Barrow & Tipler, 1986). In brief, the Anthropic 
Principle notes that that our universe possesses numerous precise laws of nature and 
conditions (e.g., the gravitational constant, the mass of a proton), and even a small 
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deviation from these values would make the evolution of life impossible – (e.g., stars and 
galaxies could not form). The fact that we do exist therefore demonstrates just how 
special our universe is.  
Notably, the design arguments underlying the Anthropic Principle and the 
Goldilocks Zone cite phenomena that benefit humans in particular (Manson, 2000; 
Bostrom, 2013); for instance, the Anthropic Principle is based on the astronomical 
improbability of a universe that supports intelligent life, like humans (hence, Anthropic). 
We argue here that anthropocentrism enhances teleological thinking where it serves 
human life for two possible reasons. First, anthropocentrism (like egocentrism; Ross & 
Sicoly, 1979) anchors us in our own perspective, so that we are ignorant to the 
experiences of other species.  So, while the value of a natural phenomenon is obvious 
when it applies to ourselves, we may not even perceive the same advantages for others. 
This also implies that we can reduce anthro-teleological bias by highlighting the 
advantages and means of survival for other targets. Indeed, the argument for intelligent 
design has been criticized for a “lack of imagination” (Dawkins, 1986; Sagan, 1973), or 
failure to appreciate counterfactual possibilities that include very different forms of life 
than our own.  Carl Sagan (1973) identified “carbon chauvinism” as a form of egocentric 
bias where it is assumed carbon is crucial for life, just because we are carbon-based 
lifeforms (see also temperature chauvinism, oxygen chauvinism; Sagan, 1973).  This is 
particularly relevant for the judgment of outcomes as fine-tuned (Bostrom, 2013). We 
may interpret the fact that Earth is the optimal temperature for human life as evidence of 
fine-tuning, for example, but fail to consider how some lifeforms thrive in temperatures 
much warmer or colder than we are used to.     
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Second, anthropocentric biases inflate the perceived importance of consequences 
for humans relative to other species. We intuitively elevate humans above other animals, 
especially in capacities of mind and agency (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Morewedge, 
Preston, & Wegner, 2007), seeing ourselves as smarter and more sophisticated than our 
beastly cousins. Anthropocentric biases shape how we see other animals (Carey, 1985); 
when we do attribute mind to other species it is usually because we have 
anthropomorphized the targets, imputing qualities reserved only for humans (Eddy, 
Gallup, & Povinelli, 1993; Waytz et al., 2010). Indeed, the idea that humans are superior 
to other species is pervasive in our culture and a difficult mindset from which to break 
free.  This is apparent in the common misunderstandings of evolution by natural selection 
(Shtulman, 2006; Evans, & Lane, 2011). One of the more radical implications of 
Darwinian evolution was that humans are just another branch in a tree of life, no more or 
less than any other species adapted to its environment (Darwin, 1859). Yet humankind is 
often depicted as the pinnacle of evolution – the top rung in the “Great Chain of Being” 
(Lovejoy, 1936; Hodos & Campbell, 1964).  We view our own species as not just 
specialized, but as special, and so too are the circumstances on which our lives depend. 
And so, anthropocentrism can promote the idea that nature is somehow directed toward 
our survival.  Human life is inherently valuable, and so when nature conspires to create 
conditions just right for human life, it seems only natural it was designed for humans in 
particular. 
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Present Research  
These five studies investigate an anthro-teleological bias in inferences to design 
in nature.  In all studies we compared teleological statements directed toward humans 
(e.g., trees produce oxygen so that humans can breathe) to the same phenomena directed 
to a non-human target (e.g., trees produce oxygen so that leopards can breathe). 
Important, we selected only natural phenomena that were other-serving (rather than self-
serving), (Keil, 1992; Kelemen, 2003), and many non-biological phenomena (e.g., the 
ozone layer). According to Keil (1992; 1995), teleological explanations can be applied to 
biological organisms where there is a self-serving adaptation, as in natural selection.  For 
example, the claim that organisms develop fever when sick in order to kill off infection is 
a scientifically warranted teleological explanation, although the organism is neither aware 
nor intends to do this. The adaption developed for the very reason that it enabled its own 
survival, and so teleological explanations are justified here.  But in our studies, we 
purposely selected non-biological natural phenomena that were other-serving, rather than 
self-serving, and so are not valid teleological explanations. For example, Jupiter’s 
massive gravity attracts comets and asteroids that could otherwise collide with Earth, but 
protecting life on Earth has no consequence for Jupiter.  In this sense, it is illogical to 
support the idea that Jupiter’s gravity developed “for” humans or other life on Earth. 
Here, teleological judgments have no scientific or logical rationale, so design inferences 
should a reflect deep intuitive biases to explain the phenomena as purposeful.   
We test three predictions.  First and foremost, we expected to find evidence for an 
anthro-teleological bias, i.e., stronger inferences to design in nature where it supports 
humans, relative to other targets.  Our further predictions test the underlying causes and 
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boundaries of the anthro-teleological bias. A key characteristic of egocentrism is biased 
perspective, similarly anthropocentrism might enhance teleological thinking towards 
humans through greater awareness of how nature benefits humans.   However, increased 
attention to how those same benefits to others might reduce this effect. Our second 
prediction, therefore, is that an anthro-teleological bias may be reduced by making 
benefits to non-humans more salient and explicit.  In addition to greater salience of 
outcomes for humans, anthropocentrism may also affect the relative value of those 
outcomes. That is, the implications of natural phenomena for human survival carry 
greater significance and importance than implications for other species, equally affected 
by the same phenomena. This would be supported by a spontaneous anthro-teleological 
bias for phenomena that helps both humans and non-humans. We predict that people will 
spontaneously support more teleological statements for humans vs. other targets when 
presented with new information about a natural phenomenon that is implied to support 
human and non-human life.   
 
 
Study 1: Evidence for bias in teleological thinking toward humans 
Study 1 provided an initial test of an anthropocentric bias in teleological 
reasoning. Participants responded true or false to a series of causal and teleological 
statements, including some that described a natural phenomenon as developing to support 
either humans or another target.  We predicted that design statements will be endorsed 
more often when it is directed toward human survival.  
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Method 
 Note for all studies.  We report the results of five studies, and include all 
conditions and variables measured.  All participant exclusions are reported. Data for all 
studies may be found here: https://osf.io/4jpag/. Studies were all conducted online and 
approved by IRB protocols at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  
 
Participants.  We aimed to collect data from at least 70 participants per condition 
to observe a medium effect size (f = .25) at 80% power in a between-subjects design.  137 
people were recruited on Amazon MTurk for a small fee. (Mean age = 34.5 years; 78 
women, 59 men; 49% Christian, 45% non-religious, <6% Jewish, Buddhist, other, 0.7% 
non-reporting.) 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to either a Human-Design or 
Other-Design condition and responded true/ false to 34 statements presented in random 
order. Following the design of Kelemen & Rosset (2009), twenty statements served as 
control items read in both conditions. These statements consisted of True-Causal (TC) 
statements, e.g., “Objects fall downwards because they are affected by gravity”, False-
Causal (FC) statements, e.g., “Polar bears are white because they swim in icy ocean 
water”, True-Teleological (TT) statements, e.g., “Children wear mittens in the winter in 
order to keep their hands warm”, and False-Teleological (FT) statements, e.g., “Houses 
have doorbells in order to make dogs bark”.  Note that both TT and the FT statements 
refer to a purpose or intention that is outside of nature or biological processes, and so not 
directed by typical intelligent design thinking. 14 Design statements written for this study 
were also included that described a natural phenomenon that enables life. In the Human-
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Design condition, the Design statements described a natural phenomenon with an implied 
design to humans, e.g., “Trees make oxygen so that people can breathe”. In the Non-
Human Design condition, the statements implied a design for a non-human target e.g., 
“Trees make oxygen so that leopards can breathe” (see Table 1).  Of these 14 items, four 
items described phenomena that affected Earth or another planet, e.g., “Sun produces heat 
and energy so to keep Earth (Venus) warm.”  Following all statements participants were 
asked demographic information, including whether they were religious (yes/ no), and 
debriefed. 
 
Results 
Agreement by Statement Type.  Agreement with all 34 items were coded 1 = True; 
False = 0, for analysis. Mean agreement and error rates were calculated for each category 
of statements. As expected, mean agreement for true statements was high (TC items, M = 
97%, SD = .10; TT items: M = 98%, SD = .11), and mean agreement for false statements 
was low (FC items, M = 13%, SD = .22; FT items, M = 11%, SD = .19).  For our 
purposes here, we distinguish between ordinary teleological statements, e.g., “People 
wear contact lenses in order to see more clearly” and design teleological statements e.g., 
“Earth has water so that horses can survive”, with the design statements directed to either 
humans or another target.   Overall participants endorsed a third of the Design items, 
regardless of target (M = 33%, SD = .37), more than either FT items (repeated-measures 
ANOVA, F(1, 136) = 79.11, p < .001, p2 = 0.37 [0.26, 0.46] or FC items (F(1, 136) = 
43.66, p < .001) but less than TC or TT items (F(1, 136) = 69.62, p < .001). 
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Anthro-teleological Bias. To test the primary hypothesis that teleological thinking 
is stronger toward human targets, mean endorsement of design statements was analyzed 
by two-group between-subjects ANOVA.  Results illustrated a robust anthropocentric 
bias (F (1, 135) = 22.38, p < .001, d .  More design statements were endorsed for 
human targets (M= 45%, SD = .34) compared to non-human targets (M= 20%, SD = .26) 
(See Table 1).  Of the 14 design items, ten items described a phenomenon where the 
implied design was directed toward a particular species (humans vs. another animal), and 
four items described a phenomenon where the implied design was toward a planet (Earth 
vs. another planet). We reasoned the anthro-teleological bias should extend to a 
geocentric bias as Earth is our home planet, and results supported this prediction. Mean 
agreement with teleological statements was nearly identical for items describing species 
(M= 46%, SD = .36) vs. planets (M= 45%, SD = .34). We compared the magnitude of the 
anthro-teleological biases with a 2 (Design target: Humans/ Other) x 2 (Items: Anthro/ 
Geocentric) ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor, and found no 
difference (F(1, 135) = .80, p =.37, p2 = .006). The bias was equivalent for the 
statements that were exclusively focused on human/ non-human targets (F(1, 135) = 
19.56, p < .001, d = .80) and for Earth/ extra-terrestrial targets (F(1, 135) = 18.40, p < 
.001, d = .74).   
Religion and teleological reasoning. Religious people have been shown to rely on 
more intuitive judgments (Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012) and use more intentional and 
teleological explanations (Banerjee & Bloom, 2014). We therefore examined how 
religious belief may relate to causal and teleological judgments. We can look at 
differences in judgment by calculating the error rate for each of the statement categories 
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and the overall error rate. Religiousness was dummy coded 0 = none/ 1 = religious, based 
on affiliation data. Error rates were analyzed with a 2 (Religion) x 2 (Design condition: 
Human/ Other) MANOVA. Over all statement types, religious people made more errors 
(9.7%) than non-religious people (4.5%; F (1, 132) = 7.36, p = .008, d = .48). On the 
target Design items, religious people agreed more (41%) than non-religious people, 
(23%, F(1, 132) = 9.12, p = .003, d = .54). Moreover, this effect of religion on design 
items held when controlling for overall error rate (F(1, 131) = 4.93, p = .028,p2 = .036).  
In other words, religious people showed higher overall endorsement of design in general, 
but this was not due to being more error-prone. Further, though religious people did 
endorse more design statements, there was no Religion x Target interaction (F <1), 
meaning the size of the anthro-teleological bias was equivalent for religious and non-
religious people.  
Summary 
Study 1 provided initial evidence for an anthro-teleological bias. Participants 
endorsed more design statements when the implied purpose was to benefit humans, 
compared to the same statements framed to help other targets. This shows how design 
inferences can be applied selectively. Indeed, we can hold different kinds of explanations 
simultaneously (Legare & Shtulman, 2018), ready to interpret phenomena using either 
teleological or non-teleological explanations. But anthropocentrism may enhance 
tendencies to see design in nature when it helps humans. These results show judgments 
bend more toward design when there is a benefit to human survival.  
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Study 2: Anthro-teleological bias is not deliberately controlled  
Study 1 provided initial evidence for the anthro-teleological bias. Study 2 aimed 
to replicate these findings and also examine the extent that the bias is effortfully 
controlled. As in Study 1, participants responded true or false to a series of causal and 
teleological statements, including some design statements that described a natural 
phenomenon as serving either humans or another target.  We also included a time 
pressure condition (between-subjects) to induce cognitive load. Prior work has shown 
that time pressure can increase general teleological thinking, (e.g., Kelemen & Rosset, 
2009; Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2013) suggesting teleological thinking is an intuitive 
bias that is effortfully controlled.  We expected to replicate the anthro-teleological bias in 
both speeded and unspeeded conditions (greater design attributed for humans than non-
humans).  We did not make an a priori prediction about the effects of time pressure on the 
anthro-teleological bias, however the results can help clarify the extent that the bias 
operates under conscious control. If the bias does increase under time pressure (i.e., 
people become more likely to attribute design toward humans relative to other targets), 
this would suggest that cognitive resources are used to adjust tendencies to attribute 
design toward humans.  If we see no effect of time pressure on the size of the bias, this 
implies that the bias is not effortfully controlled when cognitive resources are available. 
This study follows the design of Study 1 using several statements that participants 
responded to as true/false, including some nature-design items where there was an 
implied design toward either humans or a non-human target.  We included a between-
subjects time pressure condition in which participants were told to answer questions as 
quickly as possible.  
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Method 
Participants.  We aimed to collect data from at least 300 participants to observe a 
medium effect (f = .25) at 95% power in a four-group between-subjects design.  303 
people were recruited on Amazon Mturk for a small fee. (Mean age = 38.8 years; 151 
women, 150 men 2 non-reporting; 49% Christian, 42% non-religious, <7% Jewish, 
Hindu, Buddhist, other, 3 % non-reporting.) 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned one of four conditions in a 2–
Design Target: Human/ Other) x 2 (Time Pressure) between-subjects design. The overall 
design and items followed Study 1, including True-Causal (TC) statements, False-Causal 
(FC) True-Teleological (TT) and False-Teleological (FT) statements.   We included 8 
Design in nature statements used in Study 1, e.g., “Trees make oxygen so that people can 
breathe”, but dropped design items focused on Earth/ other planets to focus on 
anthropocentric items. Participants in both conditions were told their task was to answer 
28 true or false questions. In the Time Pressure condition, participants were instructed we 
were looking at how many questions they can answer correctly in under 2 minutes, and 
questions automatically advanced when participants clicked true or false. Following all 
statements participants were asked demographic information, including religious 
affiliation, and debriefed. 
 
Results 
Agreement by Statement Type.  Agreement with all 28 items were coded 1 = True; 
False = 0, for analysis. Mean agreement and error rates were calculated for each category 
of statements. As expected, mean agreement for true statements was high (TC items, M = 
ANTHRO-TELEOLOGICAL BIAS 
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92%, SD = .17; TT items: M = 93%, SD = .17), and mean agreement for false statements 
was low (FC items, M = 23%, SD = .29; FT items, M = 21%, SD = .28).  As in Study 1, 
we distinguish between ordinary teleological statements, e.g., “People wear contact 
lenses in order to see more clearly” and Design teleological statements e.g., “Earth has 
water so that horses can survive”.   Overall participants endorsed almost half of the 
Design items (M = 46%, SD = .38), more than either FT items (repeated-measures 
ANOVA, F(1, 301) = 145.08, p < .001,  or FC items (F(1, 301) = 109.92, p < .001) but 
less than TC (F(1, 301) = 331.45, p < .001).or TT items (F(1, 301) = 371.71, p < .001). 
Time Pressure. Total time participants spent on the task was recorded and 
analyzed by a one-way ANOVA by time pressure condition. Participants finished more 
quickly under time pressure (M = 3 minutes, 42 seconds) compared to no time pressure, 
(M = 4 minutes, 37 seconds, F (1, 301) = 4.09, p = .044), suggesting the time pressure 
manipulation was effective.  Effects of time pressure on responses were analyzed by a 
one-way ANOVA. Time pressure did not affect responses to either True Causal (F < 1) 
or True Teleological (F < 1) or False Causal statements (F(1, 301) = 1.28, p =.26).  For 
False Teleological statements there was more agreement under time pressure (M = 24% 
SD = .29) than without (M = 18% SD = .26), but this was above significance threshold 
(F(1, 301) = 1.28, p = 056).  
Anthro-teleological Bias.  Teleological thinking was analysed by 2 (Target: 
Human/ Other) x 2 (Timed) design. As in Study 1, results supported an anthropocentric 
bias (F(1, 298) = 38.11, p < .001). More design statements were endorsed on human 
items (M= 59%, SD = .35) compared to other items (M= 33%, SD = .36). But there was 
no effect of time pressure on design items nor an interaction between design target and 
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time pressure (Fs < 1), and time pressure did not affect mean agreement for either 
human-design or other design statements.    
Religion and teleological reasoning. As in Study 1, we examined how 
religiousness may predict stronger teleological thinking. Religiousness was dummy 
coded (0 = none/ 1 = religious) based on affiliation data.   On the Design items, error 
rates were analyzed with a 2 (Religion) x 2 (Design condition: Human/ Other) 
MANOVA. Religious people agreed with more design statements (51%) than non-
religious people, (37%, F(1, 290) = 7.76, p = .006, p2 = .026. However, there was no 
Religion x Target interaction (F <1). Though religious people did endorse more design 
statements, the anthro-teleological bias was equivalent for religious and non-religious 
people.  
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated results of Study 1 and provided further evidence for an anthro-
teleological bias in judgments of design. Participants endorsed more design statements 
when the implied purpose was to benefit humans, compared to the same statements 
framed to help other targets.  Study 2 also examined anthro-teleological thinking under a 
cognitive load condition, using a time pressure manipulation. In previous studies, time 
pressure increased agreement with teleological reasoning (e.g., Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; 
Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2013), indicating that the tendency toward teleological 
thinking is adjusted by conscious attention. Time pressure increased endorsement for 
ordinary false teleological statements (e.g., “Mice run away from cats in order to get 
exercise”), though the effect was above significance threshold (p=.056). But time 
pressure did not enhance agreement with anthro-teleological statements (e.g., “The Sun 
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makes light so that people can see”) and did not further increase the gap between human 
and non-human teleological thinking.  This suggests that the anthro-teleological bias is 
not corrected through deliberate controlled processes. This is perhaps not surprising, as 
the difference between human and nonhuman teleology is already quite large in the 
unspeeded condition, making it difficult to increase the size of the effect in time pressure 
condition.  But this does necessarily mean that it not a bias in the true sense. We observe 
a strong asymmetry in teleological thinking towards humans, which reflects a bias in 
teleological judgment, even without cognitive control.   There are other cognitive biases 
that are expressed without cognitive control because they effectively distort intuitive 
judgment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).  Likewise, the fact that anthro-teleological 
thinking appears independent of cognitive resources implies how pervasive and intuitive 
anthropocentric effects are. Indeed, the size of the anthro-teleological bias under 
unspeeded conditions suggests there is little effort to control the bias even under 
conscious awareness. In subsequent studies we further examine the automaticity, whether 
in can be adjusted through attention to other targets, and if we observe the bias 
spontaneously for novel phenomena.  
 
Study 3: Salient benefits to another species  
Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence that people see greater design in nature 
towards humans than for non-humans. One reason for this anthro-teleological bias may 
be observer effect: humans may be privileged targets of design attributions because we 
simply know more about humans than nonhuman animals (Heyman, Phillips, & Gelman, 
2003). On an individual level, egocentric biases can enhance focus on how outcomes 
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affect oneself, and when there is a benefit to everyone, people overestimate advantages 
for oneself (Windschitl, Kruger, & Simms, 2003).   Practice with perspective taking can 
adjust egocentric biases, however (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004).  Similarly, 
Study 3 tested whether the anthro-teleological could be adjusted by increasing salience of 
shared benefits to non-humans.  We selected a natural phenomenon where people should 
be familiar with the benefits to humans but not necessarily for other targets: UV 
protection by the ozone layer.  In Study 1, an item on the ozone layer showed the greatest 
anthro-teleological bias, with 63% agreeing that the ozone layer developed in order to 
protect humans from harmful radiation, compared to only 26% who agreed it developed 
to protect to non-human target (giraffes).  Participants read a brief scientific description 
of ozone and its development that highlighted the positive consequences for either: a) 
humans, b) giraffes, or c) did not mention any benefits. We expected greater agreement 
that the ozone layer developed to protect humans than to protect giraffes. This bias 
should be reduced when the benefit to the other target (giraffes) is made salient.  But we 
do not expect to eliminate the bias entirely. Even when it should be known the 
advantages are not limited to humans, people may still preferentially apply design 
thinking toward human life.   
 
Method 
Participants.  We aimed to collect a minimum of 120 participants (less 
exclusions) to observe a medium effect size (f = .25) at 80% power in a mixed ANOVA.  
All participants were recruited on Amazon Mturk for a small fee. 451 people were 
recruited with 14 omitted for duplicate IP addresses, leaving N = 438 (Mean age = 36.7 
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years; (194 women, 239 men, 1 other, 4 non-reporting; 51% Christian, 37% no affiliation, 
<10% Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, other, 2.7% non-reporting).   
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 3 
(Benefit: Human/ Other/ Control) x 2 (Likelihood: Low/ High) between-subjects design. 
In all conditions, participants read a description of how the ozone layer developed. 
Though not part of our primary hypotheses, we manipulated whether the development of 
the ozone layer was framed as only somewhat unlikely (1 in 5 chance) or extremely 
unlikely (1 in 5 trillion chance), as fine-tuning arguments often rely on highly improbable 
outcomes.   To test our primary hypothesis, the apparent benefits of the ozone layer were 
framed as helping either humans, other targets, or no benefits were described.  In the No-
Benefit condition, the passages did not include any explicit mention of the benefits of the 
phenomena. In both Benefit conditions, the description explicitly illustrated the benefits 
of the phenomenon. In the Human-Benefit condition, the ozone layer was described as 
protecting humans from UV radiation.  
Measures. Before the target dependent measures, two multiple-choice questions 
asked participants to recall factual details about the formation of ozone the statistical 
probability provided in the description.  Participants next rated: 1) subjective probability 
of the ozone layer developing on three items (how likely was the development, how 
certain, how many factors could disrupt its natural development), 2) subjective value on 
two items (how good, how important), and 3) how “lucky” the development of the ozone 
layer was, each on 7-point Likert scales.    
Participants responded to teleological statements framed towards humans and 
other targets in a repeated-measure design. Participants rated their agreement of whether 
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the ozone layer developed to protect humans and giraffes, on two respective 7-point 
scales. Participants next completed a five-item religiosity scale (e.g., “I consider myself 
to be a religious person”).  To check the prior familiarity with the phenomenon, 
participants in both studies were asked two questions: 1) “Before this study, did you know 
about the ozone layer?” (7–point scale) and “Before this study, did you know that the 
ozone layer absorbs harmful UV radiation?” (Yes, No, Unsure). Finally, participants 
were asked demographic information including religious affiliation, and debriefed. 
 
 
Results 
 Prior Knowledge.  As expected, participants reported strong familiarity with the 
ozone layer and its benefits prior to the study.  For general familiarity (1-7) with the 
ozone layer, participants were well above the midpoint of the scale (M = 5.38, SD = 1.46, 
t(437) = 21.28, p < .001).   The majority of participants in (79.5%) answered in the 
affirmative they were aware “the ozone layer absorbs harmful UV radiation” before 
participating in the study.   
 Subjective Probability, Subjective Value, and Luck. For brevity, analyses of these 
variables in Studies 3-5 are discussed in Supplementary Materials.   
 Teleology.  As a test of our primary hypotheses, responses to the teleology 
questions in Study 3 were analyzed by a 3 (Benefit: Humans, Other, Control) x 2 
(Likelihood) x 2 (Design target: Human/ Giraffe) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures 
on last variable, see means by condition in Figure 1. There was a main effect of Design 
target, showing the predicted anthro-teleological bias: F (1, 432) = 117.85, p < .001 p2 = 
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.21 [0.15, 0.28]. Participants were more likely to endorse the design statement for humans 
(M = 4.53, SD = 2.21) than for giraffes (M = 3.29, SD = 2.24) across all conditions. There 
was no main effect of Likelihood condition, (F(1,32) = 2.15, p = .14). The Likelihood x 
Benefit interaction was significant (F(2, 432) = 3.43, p = .03), but this interaction was not 
predicted and did not fit any meaningful pattern. The main effect of Benefit was non-
significant (F < 1).  But more important, the predicted Benefit x Design interaction was 
significant, F(2, 427) = 7.65, p < .001, p2 = .034 [0.01, 0.07], demonstrating the anthro-
teleological bias varied by whom the outcome seemed to benefit. Difference scores were 
calculated to measure the size of the bias in each condition, and pairwise comparisons 
found the bias was significantly smaller in the Giraffe-Benefit (M= .52, SD = 1.92) 
condition compared to both the control condition (M = 1.50, SD = 2.24; p < .001) and 
Human Benefit condition (M = 1.47, SD = 2.21; p < .001), but the bias was not different 
between the control and Human-Benefit conditions (p=.89).  Reading about the benefits 
of the ozone layer for giraffes reduced the anthro-teleological bias but did not eliminate it 
and reading about the benefits to humans did not increase the bias above baseline. This 
overall pattern suggests that the knowledge of benefits of the ozone layer for humans was 
accessible prior to the study, and this anchored relative design judgments toward humans.  
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Figure 1.  Anthro-teleological bias, Study 3.  
 
 
Religion and Teleological thinking. We also analyzed the role of religious belief 
in teleological thinking. Keeping with Study 1, religion was dummy coded (none = 0; 
religious = 1) based on religious affiliation data. Means for ozone teleology were 
analyzed by 3 (Benefit) x 2 (Religious: Yes/ No) x 2 (Design: Humans/ Non-human) with 
repeated measures on last variable.  There was a main effect of religion on teleological 
thinking, F (1, 420) = 34.70, p < .001, p2 = .076 [0.03, 0.12], with religious people 
endorsing more teleological statements in general.  Moreover, the Religion x Design 
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interaction was significant F (1, 420) = 8.35, p = .004, p2 = .019. Both religious and non-
religious people inferred greater design toward humans, but the bias was larger among 
religious people.  
 
 
Discussion 
Study 3 provided further evidence for an anthro-teleological bias for the ozone 
layer as a natural phenomenon known to benefit humans. Though the ozone layer 
provides UV protection to all life on Earth, participants expressed more agreement with 
the statement the ozone layer developed to protect humans than the same statement about 
giraffes. Important, the bias toward humans was as strong in the control condition (when 
no benefits to humans were mentioned) as in the Human-Benefit condition, suggesting a 
pre-existing bias towards humans. This could be partly explained by preferential 
knowledge about the consequences to our own species.   The ozone layer is well-known 
to provide UV protection to humans, but these same benefits may be less well-known for 
other animals.  Indeed, the size of the bias was reduced by describing benefits of the 
ozone layer for giraffes.  Yet the bias was not entirely eliminated in the Giraffe-Benefit 
condition, suggesting the effects of anthropocentrism are not just due to perspective-
taking issues.  
One issue with the present study is the particular use of giraffes as a comparison, 
both in the conditions, and the teleological items.  In the Giraffe condition, highlighting 
benefits for giraffes could imply there was something special about giraffes compared to 
other animals. And in all conditions, asking about humans and inflating the bias. Of 
ANTHRO-TELEOLOGICAL BIAS 
   
 
25 
course, that there should be any difference between the two reflects an anthropocentric 
bias in itself. But we address these issues in the next study by highlighting benefits to a 
general category of animals and asking teleological items about several different species.  
 
Study 4: Salient benefits to many species  
Study 3 found inferences to design for the ozone layer were stronger toward 
protecting humans than a specific non-human target (giraffes). But the bias was reduced 
after describing the benefits of the ozone layer for giraffes. Study 4 extends these 
findings by highlighting benefits to a larger category of targets (“land-dwelling 
animals”). As in Study 3, this tests whether decreasing focus toward human outcomes (by 
highlighting the benefits to non-humans) reduces anthro-teleological bias. But Study 4 
has two significant improvements over Study 3.  First, Study 4 includes a condition that 
describes general benefits of the ozone layer for a group of targets, rather than 
highlighting for one particular non-human target.  Important, this larger category includes 
humans but is not exclusive to humans, and neither humans not any other species are 
mentioned. This reflects how natural phenomena typically affect multiple targets in a 
similar way, but we may attend more to consequences for humans. As in Study 3, we 
expect this manipulation to reduce the anthro-teleological bias. If there is still stronger 
design toward humans here, it would suggest the intuition to apply design to humans is 
not merely due to biased knowledge about benefits.  Second, whereas participants in 
Study 3 made teleological judgments for only humans and giraffes, participants in Study 
4 were asked about several different targets. The particular comparison with giraffes in 
Study 3 may have stuck out as unusual,  set up a stronger contrast between the two. But 
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the present study used five different (and relatively ordinary) targets that serve as a 
collective generic comparison between non-humans to humans and there is no particular 
contrast between humans and any single target.   
 
 
Method 
Participants.  499 participants were recruited for a small payment on Mturk. Data 
from 8 participants were omitted for duplicate IP addresses, total N = 491. (Mean age = 
35.6 years, 244 women, 237 men, 2 other, 7 non-reporting; 43.6% Christian, 45.4% non-
religious, 10.3% Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and other, 0.6% non-reporting.)  
 
Procedure. The design of Study 4 closely followed the design of Study 3. As in 
Study 3, all conditions (control, Human-Benefit, General-Benefit) described how ozone 
formed in the Earth’s atmosphere. The Human-Benefit condition also described 
specifically how the ozone layer protected humans from deadly UV.  The General- 
Benefit condition, described the ozone layer as protecting “land-dwelling animals” from 
deadly UV, a category inclusive but not exclusive to humans. Participants responded to 
teleological statements framed towards humans and five other targets in a repeated-
measure design. Participants rated their agreement of whether the ozone layer developed 
to protect humans, pigs, dogs, birds, cows, and giraffes, on six respective 7-point scales, 
in randomized order. Participants were next given three measures of religious attitudes: 
1) a four-item scale to assess general Intelligent Design beliefs (e.g., “The Universe is 
fine-tuned so that life can exist and flourish”), 2) a nine-item scale on Belief in an 
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intervening God (e.g., “I believe God is personally involved in my life”), and a five-item 
religiosity scale (e.g., “I consider myself to be a religious person”). To check the prior 
familiarity with the phenomenon, participants in both studies were two questions: 1) 
“Before this study, did you know about the ozone layer?” (7–point scale) and “Before 
this study, did you know that the ozone layer absorbs harmful UV radiation?” (Yes, No, 
Unsure). Finally, participants were asked demographic information including religious 
affiliation, and debriefed. 
 
Prior Knowledge.  As expected, participants reported strong familiarity with the ozone 
layer and its benefits prior to the study.  For general familiarity (1-7) with the ozone 
layer, participants were well above the midpoint of the scale (M = 5.52, SD = 1.37; t 
(490) = 24.39, p < .001), and the majority of participants (81%) answered in the 
affirmative that they were aware “the ozone layer absorbs harmful UV radiation” before 
participating in the study.   
Teleology.  Here we asked design questions for humans and five non-human 
targets (pigs, dogs, birds, cows, giraffes). We confirmed there were no differences in 
teleological judgment between these five targets, using a 5-level repeated-measures 
ANOVA (F(4, 476) = .36, p = .84). We calculated mean teleology for all non-human 
targets,  .97.  Responses to teleology items were analyzed by a 3 (Benefit: 
Control/Human/General) x 2 (Likelihood) x 2 (Design bias: Human/ Other) mixed 
MANOVA with repeated measures on last variable, see means in Figure 2. There was a 
main effect of Design showing a robust anthropocentric bias (F(1, 485) = 151.76, p < 
.001 p2 = .24 [0.18, 0.29]). Participants were more likely to endorse the teleological 
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statement for humans (M = 4.19, SD = 2.40) than for other animals (M = 3.25 SD = 2.07) 
across all conditions.  There was no main effect of Likelihood condition (F(1, 485) = 
2.02, p = .16) nor any interaction with Likelihood and other conditions on judgments (Fs 
< 1.63, ps > .20).  There was a main effect of Benefit condition (F (2, 485) = 6.22, p = 
.002, p2 = .025 [0.01, 0.05]), qualified by a significant Design x Benefit Interaction (F 
(2, 485) = 31.45, p < .001, p2 = .11 [0.07, 0.16]).  Although an anthro-teleological bias 
was observed in all Benefit conditions, the size of the bias varied.  The bias was strongest 
in Human-Benefit condition, where only benefits to humans are described (F (1, 165) = 
100.73, p < .001, p2 = .38 [0.28, 0.46]; Mhuman = 4.57, SD = 2.46; Mnonhumans = 2.86, SD = 
1.84). Anthro-teleological bias was also present in the Control condition, where no 
benefit to humans or other animals was explicitly mentioned (F (1, 152) = 36.98, p < 
.001, p2 = .196 [0.11, 0.28], Mhuman = 3.66, SD = 2.46; Mnonhumans = 2.95, SD = 1.91). 
Anthro-teleological bias was smallest in General-Benefit condition, F (1, 168) = 16.71, p 
< .001, p2 = .09 [0.03, 0.16], where the ozone layer was described as essential to survival 
of “land-dwelling animals” (Mhuman = 4.30, SD = 2.46; Mnonhumans = 3.95, SD = 2.24).  
Notably, this condition also had high endorsement for human teleology item, like the 
Human-Benefit condition, but there was also more endorsement for the non-human 
animals compared to other conditions.  The anthro-teleological bias was reduced, but not 
eliminated. People still preferentially applied teleological thinking that the ozone layer 
was “for” people, compared to other land animals.  
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Figure 2.  Anthro-teleological bias, Study 4 
 
 
 
Religion and Teleological thinking. We also analyzed the role of religious belief 
in teleological thinking. Keeping with Study 1, religiousness was dummy coded (none = 
0; religious = 1) based on religious affiliation data. Means for ozone teleology were 
analyzed by 3 (Benefit) x 2 (Religious: Yes/ No) x 2 (Design: Humans/ Non-human) with 
repeated measures on last variable.  There was a main effect of religion on teleological 
thinking F (1, 475) = 43.51, p < .001, p2 = .084 [0.05, 0.13], with religious people 
endorsing more teleological statements in general.  Moreover, the Religion x Design 
interaction was significant, F (1, 475) = 5.55, p = .019, p2 = .012 [0.00, 0.03]. Both 
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religious and non-religious people inferred greater design toward humans, but the bias 
was larger among religious people.  
 
 
Discussion  
Study 4 found further support for an anthro-teleological bias and results parallel 
and extend those in Study 3. First, participants agreed more that the ozone layer 
developed to protect humans from UV radiation, compared to other species (e.g., cows, 
pigs, etc.).  This effect was strongest in the Human-Benefit condition, where 
consequences for humans were stated explicitly, and in the control condition, where no 
benefits to any targets are stated. The effect observed in the control condition may be due 
to better awareness of the benefits for humans compared to other species. Indeed, the bias 
was reduced in the General-Benefit condition, in which the ozone layer was described as 
protecting all land animals, a general category that is inclusive but not exclusive to 
humans. Unlike Study 3 that used only giraffes as a comparison, participants in Study 4 
made teleological judgments for several different species, so no one species was singled 
out or contrasted with humans.  Neither humans nor any of the other target species asked 
in the teleological items were mentioned in the description.  
In both Studies 3 and 4, we used a phenomenon known to benefit humans: the 
ozone layer. Highlighting the general benefits to non-humans reduced the effect, 
suggesting that greater knowledge or salience of consequences for humans does play a 
role in the anthro-teleological bias. Alternatively, it could be that anthropocentric biases 
intuitively elevate design when it applies to humans, as soon as any benefit to humans 
becomes known.  Important, highlighting benefits to non-humans reduced the bias, but 
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did not eliminate the bias, indicating that there may be a deep-rooted anthropocentrism at 
work that inflates inferences of design toward humans regardless of knowledge or 
salience of information.   Study 5 examines this issue by testing whether the bias emerges 
spontaneously for phenomena when there is no prior knowledge of the benefits to 
humans or other species.  
 
Study 5: Spontaneous anthro-teleological bias 
In four studies we observed a robust anthro-teleological bias in inferences to 
design. Studies 3 and 4 studied the anthro-teleological bias for a well-known 
phenomenon- the ozone layer –where people are already generally familiar with the 
benefits to humans and explored the role of observer effects and salience of benefits in 
reducing the bias. In a final study, we explore whether the anthro-teleological bias 
emerges spontaneously for phenomena where benefits to human and other life are not 
previously known.  Such an effect would illustrate that anthropocentrism in teleological 
thinking is not a just a function of prior knowledge, but that deep-rooted 
anthropocentrism enhances intuitive perceptions of design that serve human life.  
We selected “Jupiter as-shield" as the target phenomenon: that Jupiter’s strong 
gravity attracts asteroids and comets towards it, and so protects the Earth (and other 
planets) from frequent collisions (Wetherill, 1994).  Jupiter’s gravity therefore has 
important implications for protecting life on Earth, including humans. But this 
phenomenon is not common knowledge—in pretesting, about 80% Mturk participants 
had no prior knowledge that Jupiter’s gravity prevents asteroid collisions with Earth or 
other planets.  Participants in the present study read information about Jupiter’s strong 
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gravity, in one of three between-subject conditions.  The control condition described 
Jupiter’s gravity with no additional information on its positive implications.  The Earth-
benefit condition included information on how Jupiter’s gravity protected the Earth from 
asteroids and comets by deflecting them towards Jupiter. Important, this has clear 
implications for life on Earth (including humans), but these consequences are only 
implied and not stated explicitly. In the Planets-benefit condition, the consequences of 
Jupiter were generalized even further, here described as protecting all planets in the inner 
solar system (Mercury, Venus, Earth, and Mars). This was included to diffuse the 
benefits of the phenomena to a larger scale.  As a test of anthro-teleological bias, 
participants in all conditions were asked whether Jupiter’s gravity developed to protect 
humans, and five other species: cows, bears, giraffes, ducks, and tigers.  Study 5, 
therefore, tests the depth of anthro-teleological biases by eliminating the prior knowledge 
about the natural phenomenon. We expect to find evidence for the anthro-teleological 
bias in both benefit conditions, with stronger inferences that Jupiter’s gravity developed 
to protect humans, than to protect other species.  
 
Method 
Participants.   We aimed to collect data from at least 120 participants for each target 
condition (less exclusions) to observe a medium-to-large effect size at 80% power.  A 
requirement for this study is that participants learn about a novel natural phenomenon, 
and pretesting indicated that up to 20% of Mturk samples have previous knowledge of the 
Jupiter-as-shield phenomena, that we planned to omit from analyses. 502 people were 
recruited on Mturk for a small fee. 14.8% (n = 73) responded that they knew about 
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Jupiter-as-shield before the study, and were omitted from analyses, Data from 10 
participants were removed for duplicate IP addresses, leaving a remaining N = 419 (mean 
age = 37.7 years, 231 women, 170 men, 1 other, 17 not reporting). 
Procedure. Participants in both studies were randomly assigned to condition in a 3 
(Benefit: None, Earth, Planets) x 2 (Likelihood) design. All participants began by reading 
a description of Jupiter’s size and gravity. In the Extremely Unlikely conditions, the 
likelihood of Jupiter growing to its present large size was described as “1 in 5 trillion.”  
In the Somewhat Unlikely condition, this likelihood was described as: “1 in 5 (20% 
chance).”    
In the No- Benefit (Control) condition, no benefits of Jupiter’s gravitational pull were 
mentioned.   In the Earth-Benefit condition, the effects of Jupiter’s gravity are described 
as protecting Earth, in particular, from comets and asteroids. In the Planet-Benefit 
condition, the target beneficiaries described as “planets in the inner solar system.” Before 
the target dependent measures, two multiple-choice questions asked participants to recall 
details about the size of Jupiter and the probability of it becoming so large. Five 
teleological items asked whether the Jupiter’s gravity developed to protect humans, 
tigers, cows, bears, ducks, and giraffes, in random order, on respective 7-point scales.  
Finally, to measure prior knowledge about the phenomenon, participants were 
asked two items:  1) “Before this study, how familiar were you with the effects of 
Jupiter’s size and gravity?” (7–point scale), and 2) “Before this study, did you know that 
Jupiter’s gravity is responsible for keeping asteroids and comets away?” (Yes, No, 
Unsure). 
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Results  
Anthro-teleological bias.  Study 5 examined whether an anthro-teleological bias 
emerges spontaneously for phenomena that was previously unknown, where there is a 
general benefit for many targets. Teleology judgments for non-humans (bears, ducks, 
tigers, giraffes, cows) showed high inter-item reliability ( .98). Five-level repeated-
measures ANOVA confirmed there were no differences in teleological judgments for 
these targets, F < 1.  We therefore calculated the mean for these other-teleological 
judgments. Teleological judgment was analyzed by 3 (Benefit: Earth, Planets, Control) x 
2 (Likelihood) x 2 (Design: Humans/ Other) mixed MANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last variable, see means in Figure 3.  There was a robust main effect of Design 
across all conditions reflecting an anthro-teleological bias: F (1, 410) = 214.34, p < .001, 
p2 = .34 [0.26, 0.39]. Overall, participants were more likely to endorse the design 
statement for humans (M = 3.35, SD = 2.07) than for other species (M = 2.24 SD = 1.77).  
There was no main effect of the Likelihood condition, (F < 1) nor any interaction with 
Likely and other conditions on Teleology (Fs < 1).  There was no main effect of Benefit 
condition, F (2, 410) = 1.70, p = .19.  The predicted Benefit x Design interaction was 
significant, F (2, 410) = 4.82, p =.009, p2 = .023 [0.01, 0.05] (See means Figure 3). The 
anthro-teleological bias was greater in the both the Benefit-Earth and Planet-Benefit 
conditions, where Jupiter was described as protecting planets in the “inner solar system.” 
Even if they are previously unaware of the natural benefits for humans, when general 
benefits are made apparent, people spontaneously show more teleological thinking 
toward humans than for other targets.  
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Figure 3. Anthro-teleological bias, Study 5 
 Religion and Teleological thinking. As in previous studies, religion was dummy-
coded (none = 0; religious = 1) based on religious affiliation data. There was a main 
effect of religion on teleological thinking, F (1, 410) = 39.03, p <.001, p2 = .087 [0.023, 
0.13]. Religious people endorsed teleological statements more (M = 2.73; SD = 1.79) than 
non-religious people (M = 1.76, SD = 1.29). There was a significant Religious x Design 
interaction, F (1, 410) = 5.04, p = .025, p2 = .012.  Religious and non-religious people 
showed the anthro-teleological bias but the bias was stronger in religious people. 
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Discussion 
Study 5 examined a spontaneous anthro-teleological bias in response to a novel 
phenomenon, Jupiter-as-shield. Though participants were previously unaware how 
Jupiter’s gravity prevented objects from regularly colliding with Earth (and other 
planets), they were more likely to say that Jupiter’s gravity developed to protect humans 
that to protect other kinds of life on Earth. Notably, in the experimental conditions, 
Jupiter was described as shielding either Earth as a whole or the inner solar system as a 
whole, both larger categories that include humans but are not exclusive to humans.  Yet 
an anthro-teleological bias was observed in both these conditions, with stronger design 
perceived toward helping humans than other species (cows, giraffes, bears, tigers, ducks). 
Although no species are mentioned (humans or otherwise), the implications for humans 
were immediately applied to humans and seem to take priority over other targets.  
Interestingly, the effect was also observed in a control condition, that described the size 
of Jupiter and its gravity, but not how it deflects objects away from Earth or other planets. 
Yet when asked, naïve participants are still more likely to say it is to protect humans than 
any other species.   This study illustrates the depth of anthropocentric bias in teleological 
reasoning. Anthro-teleological biases do not rely on privileged information about 
outcomes for humans, but emerge spontaneously when benefits to humans are implied for 
new phenomena.   
 
General Discussion 
Our intuitive tendency for teleological thinking helps create the compelling 
impression that nature is designed to support life, especially when it concerns human life.    
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In five studies. this research found evidence for an anthro-teleological bias to see more 
design towards humans.  For example, it seems more intuitive that trees produce oxygen 
for humans, but less so that trees produce oxygen for leopards.  Others have hinted at this 
bias in cosmological design inferences (Sagan, 1973; Bostrom, 2013), but this work is the 
first to show that people endorse design framed to help humans more than the same 
statements framed to help other targets.    
Why more design for humans?  
Teleological thinking toward nature is an explanatory stance grounded in social-
cognitive biases to infer intentionality (Kelemen, 1999). But an important question to as 
is why these biases should be especially strong where it concerns our own species. 
Anthropocentric biases sharpen our attention to the ways that nature helps humans, and 
by doing so may accentuate design thinking towards humans through increased 
awareness and value of self-relevant outcomes.   
 Human-relevant outcomes are more salient.  Anthropocentric biases are 
fundamentally an extension of egocentric biases, characterized by self-centered 
perspective on human experience.  In general, egocentric biases give us privileged 
knowledge about things that affect the self, including private information about desires 
and intentions (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004; Pronin & Kugler, 2010). When we benefit from 
advantages that affect many equally, self-advantages are more apparent and exaggerated 
relative to others (Windschitl, Kruger, & Simms, 2003). For example, in a competitive 
trivia game, people overestimate the extent they are helped by clues relative to the same 
clues given to other players (Windschitl, Kruger, & Simms, 2003). Similarly, 
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anthropocentric biases make us better at seeing how nature helps humans than how it 
helps others, which enhances relative teleological thinking towards humans.   
We explored this in Studies 3 and 4 with a phenomenon well-known to benefit 
humans: the ozone layer. In Study 3, statements that the ozone layer developed “to 
protect humans” were supported more than statements about how it was developed to 
protect another specific target—giraffes.  But this difference was reduced when the 
benefits to giraffes were made explicit beforehand. This could be the result of the overt 
comparison to a single target, perhaps signalling there is something special about giraffes 
as an example.  But in Study 4, we made the general benefits of the ozone layer explicit 
for a category that included many targets—land animals—before teleological judgments 
toward various targets.  Again, design statements directed towards humans were endorsed 
more strongly than for other targets. But increasing salience of the benefits to a category 
(land animals) reduced the difference in teleological judgments.  Together, the results of 
Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that the asymmetry in teleological judgments is partially due 
to skewed attention or awareness of the benefits for humans, as increasing salience of 
others’ benefits reduces the effect.  However, it is important to note it did not eliminate 
the bias entirely; there is still stronger design attributed towards humans when the 
advantages to others are made explicit.  We also consistently observe anthro-teleological 
bias in the control conditions in all studies, when no benefits to any target (human or 
otherwise) are described. Thus, greater knowledge about benefits to humans may 
contribute to greater perceived design to humans, but privileged knowledge does not 
completely account for the tendency to infer more design toward humans than other 
targets.  
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 Human-relevant outcomes are more special.  A second reason that 
anthropocentrism can increase design toward humans is through inflated value given to 
human life.   As humans, we see nature through an anthropocentric lens, and it is easy to 
tell ourselves a tale of why human life is special. We seem, to ourselves at least, to be the 
very pinnacle of life. Phenomena that benefit humans may lend itself to stronger 
teleology because these outcomes are valued more, and simply deemed more important. 
Anthropocentrism can therefore inflate the perception of design towards human life 
because these outcomes align with our own self-interests. This general idea is compatible 
with Kelemen's (1999) intention-based theory, in not only the attribution of beliefs and 
desires, but that action is inferred to match beliefs and desires (Dennett, 1987; Preston & 
Wegner, 2005).   In particular, cues that typically trigger teleological thinking may be 
especially sensitive where it concerns humans because it aligns with our own goals for 
survival.   Liquin and Lombrozo (2018) have argued that an important factor in 
determining the appropriateness of a teleological explanation is its structure-function fit. 
For example, the idea that trees make oxygen so that animals can breathe is compelling 
not because it especially suits the biology of trees, but that it seems to serve a function- in 
this case to provide the life-supporting air we need to breathe.  In comparison, people 
tend to reject “bad” teleological explanations (e.g., “animals grow ears because they need 
to smell things”; Lombrozo & Carey, 2006; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009), that don’t follow 
a coherent causal logic. Processes that enable human survival directly align with our own 
goals so it is easier–even sensible—to understand those functions through intentional 
processes.   
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This explanation was not directlt tested here, but in Study 5, we examined 
whether the bias would emerge spontaneously for novel phenomena. Here, participants 
were exposed to new information about a natural phenomenon (Jupiter as shield) where 
the beneficial outcome was relevant to all life on Earth, including humans.   In this case, 
the privileged knowledge of benefits to humans is not a factor, as participants had no 
prior knowledge at all. Humans were never named explicitly as a beneficiary, it is merely 
implied as it affects all life on Earth. Yet, people still attributed greater teleology for the 
event towards protecting humans than for other species – pigs, birds, etc.  Even with no 
prior information, and no specific information about humans, judgments of design toward 
humans still trumped those for other targets. The fact that human-directed teleology is 
endorsed spontaneously reflects it is perceived to be a good teleological explanation, i.e., 
merits an intentional explanation, more so than for other targets.  This spontaneous 
anthro-teleological bias for novel phenomena implies a deep anthropocentrism at work 
that automatically prioritizes implications for human life over other species.      
 
Anthro-teleological bias or belief 
We also interested in the extent to which anthro-teleological thinking may be 
considered a cognitive bias, i.e., a default to see greater design for humans, or a belief, 
i.e., a conscious attitude that nature is intended to support humans. In Study 2, we 
examined whether the effects could be enhanced by a time pressure manipulation, 
following design of other studies.  If design attributions toward humans increased under 
time pressure, this would be evidence for an intuitive default towards anthro-teleology 
that is controlled through conscious effort (Kelemen & Rosset, 2003). But the absence of 
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such an effect does not suggest it is not a default (bias), but only that the preference is not 
deliberately controlled. Important, we also find the bias emerges spontaneously for novel 
phenomena that enable human survival – even though the circumstances reap benefits to 
many targets, and humans are not explicitly named as beneficiaries. This suggests that the 
tendency to attribute more design toward humans is automatic and intuitive.   But 
importantly, this does not preclude the possibility that judgments are also affected by 
explicit beliefs that nature’s purpose is to serve humans. Rather, anthro-teleological 
thinking may operate both intuitively and explicitly.  
The interplay between explicit belief and intuitive biases on anthro-teleological 
thinking can be seen in the effects of religiousness on agreement with teleological 
statements.  Teleological thinking is often stronger among religious people (Banerjee & 
Bloom, 2014), but not dependent upon religious belief (Järnefelt, Canfield, & Kelemen, 
2015).  We also found stronger teleological thinking among religious participants here, 
and in Studies 3-5, the anthro-teleological bias (that humans are preferentially seen as the 
target of design) was stronger in religious people as well. Most religious participants in 
these studies were Christian, a religion that often emphasizes the place of humans in 
Creation – so it follows that these people may hold stronger explicit ideas that nature is 
designed, and designed for humans in particular.  But we also note the bias is not 
dependent on religious belief:  non-religious people also endorsed teleological items and 
perceived more design towards humans than other targets. Even without an explicit belief 
in a “designer” we see greater endorsement of design in nature towards humans. This 
suggests a deep-rooted intuition to perceive design toward humans, that is not derived 
from explicit religious belief.   The preference for teleological thinking towards humans 
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can operate as both bias and belief, with explicit and intuitive processes reinforcing each 
other.  But it can also operate as a bias in contrast to explicit belief, emerging 
spontaneously when some serendipitous phenomena enables our survival.  
 
 
Anthropocentric, Geocentric, and Egocentric Designs 
 This research has explored whether there is a bias to see design in nature toward 
humans: an anthro-teleological bias. But interestingly, these biases also seem to extend to 
greater categories that include humans- at geocentric, biocentric, and even universe-
centric  levels. For some of our study items, it was Earth that was described as the 
beneficiary of the natural phenomenon, with the underlying implication that humans 
would be supported by outcomes on Earth, but not other planets.   This illustrates that 
teleology can be skewed on a geocentric level – i.e., the design is aimed towards the 
Earth as a whole. Other research has examined a kind of geo-teleological bias in concepts 
of a Gaia – that the Earth purposefully acts to preserve itself or if life-supporting abilities 
– e.g., maintaining its temperature, producing oxygen, maintaining an ecosystem- but 
these tend to be framed as self-serving rather than other-serving (e.g., Kelemen & Rosset, 
2009; Järnefelt, Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015).  Intelligent design theories that emphasize 
the Earth as “just right” to support life may also reflect an extension of anthropocentric 
biases to geocentric biases.  Though it is the Earth that is the object of the design, it is life 
(and human life) that is the presumed reason for the design. Similarly, arguments that the 
Universe itself is fine-tuned may reflect an extension of anthropocentrism towards the 
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Universe. Our universe is important because it is the one that contains us, and it appears 
fine-tuned because it is fine-tuned for intelligent life (read: humans).  
 Thus anthropocentric biases may underlie many biases in design. The Earth (and 
the Universe) do have ideal conditions to support life, but this only becomes “fine-tuned” 
as we consider implications for human life.  But if specialness helps create the strong 
appearance of design, apparent ordinariness undermines that same design.  Indeed, many 
of the most effective challenges to design arguments work by undermining the perceived 
speciality in one way or another. Recently, the search for Earth-like planets has 
uncovered many planets outside our solar system that could also be “just right” to support 
life (NASA, 2018), undermining the idea that Earth is a special habitat to support life. In 
relation to the Anthropic Principle, Lee Smolin (1992) argued that multiverse models 
allow for a kind of natural selection to create more universes that can support life. In 
essence, universes with the conditions to support life are also the universes that have 
black holes, and these black holes in turn give birth to similar universes with similar 
conditions. Therefore life-supporting universes are more common than universes without 
life.  In this model a universe like our own is hardly remarkable, but quite ordinary, 
perhaps inevitable.  And the weak version of the Anthropic Principle points out the 
inherent observer bias: we would only be able to remark on the finetuned properties of 
the Universe if we were already here to observe it.  These arguments and 
counterarguments for Intelligent Design reflect how an outcome feels most designed 
when it seems remarkable, and without that intuition inferences to design seem wholly 
unnecessary.  Indeed, it is this intuitive sense of specialness that underlies 
anthropocentric biases and drives teleological inferences. 
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But ultimately, geocentric and anthropocentric biases in design may all be an 
extension of egocentric biases in teleological thinking (Preston, 2018), that radiate at 
greater categories around the self.  Indeed, we see some evidence for skewed teleological 
thinking at the individual level, for example, more meaning is given to coincidental 
events that affect oneself versus others (Falk, 1989), and individual egocentrism increases 
paranormal explanations for coincidence (Moore, Thalbourne, & Storm, 2010). One 
reason we may attribute more design towards humans as a species is that we over-weight 
the value of our own personal outcomes as individuals.  Events that impact humans (and 
oneself) capture our attention and feel inherently more important, Again, crucial here is 
that an anthropocentric (or egocentric) bias amplifies the perceived importance of the 
outcome- its apparent “specialness”—that can activate stronger inferences to design. 
 
Conclusion 
 People are intuitive design thinkers and inherently anthropocentric. Together these 
biases conspire to make judgments of design especially likely when outcomes benefit 
humans—an anthro-teleological bias.  This tendency can be adjusted if people see the 
same advantages for other species. But at the heart of the bias is that outcomes seem 
more special when they affect humans, which enhances our existing teleological thinking, 
and makes the anthro-teleological bias especially difficult to overcome.     
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Table 1. Percent agreement with teleological statement, by condition 
Design Statement 
 
Human Non-human 
Earth has an ozone layer in order to protect people (giraffes) 
from harmful radiation.  
 
63% 37% 
The moon orbits the Earth to provide humans (wolves) with a 
stable climate.  
 
31% 23% 
Earth is near the Sun so that humans (monkeys) can receive 
warmth.  
 
43% 25% 
The Sun makes light so that people (bears) can see.  
 
47% 23% 
The Earth rotates every 24 hours to regulate the temperature 
for humans (goats).  
 
24% 12% 
The Earth has water so that humans (horses) can survive.  
 
50% 28% 
Fruits are high in vitamin C so that people (squirrels) can be 
healthy.  
 
49% 6% 
Trees make oxygen so that people (leopards) can breathe.  
 
63% 30% 
Water evaporates and then precipitates so to provide people 
(dogs) with fresh water. 
 
43% 22% 
The atmosphere is 20% oxygen so that humans (foxes) can 
live. 
 
46% 10% 
Earth (Saturn) orbits the Sun once a year so that it can have 
seasons. 
 
46% 25% 
Jupiter’s gravity attracts asteroids in order to protect Earth 
(Mars) from collisions.  
 
31% 25% 
Supernovas exploded long ago so that metals could later form 
on Earth (Mars).  
 
32% 21% 
Sun produces heat and energy so to keep Earth (Venus) warm. 63% 20% 
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